

ON THE SYNONYMITY OF *AN* AND *KE*

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BERTHOLD Delbrück¹ sums up the differences between *ãn* and *κε* as follows: "(1) *ãn* hat eine Neigung zu negativen Sätzen . . .; (2) *κε* hat eine entschiedene Vorliebe für die konjunktivischen Relativsätze . . .; (3) *κε* wird bisweilen in disjunktiven Satzgliedern wiederholt, *ãn* nicht." He adds, "Folgerungen möchte ich aus diesen Tatsachen zunächst nicht ziehen, immerhin sind sie aber wichtig genug, um erwähnt zu werden," since, as he states a few lines earlier, it might be difficult "den Unterschied zwischen *κε* und *ãn* deutlich anzugeben. Indessen ganz gleichbedeutend sind sie sicher nicht gewesen."

Ferdinand Sommer² holds the same view. Raphael Kühner and Bernhard Gerth,³ on the other hand, state: "Im allgemeinen . . . stimmen beide Partikeln hinsichtlich ihrer Verwendung überein. Sie modifizieren eine Aussage in der Weise, dass die Handlung als *unter gewissen Umständen wirklich eintretend* bezeichnet wird. Die weitere Annahme, dass *ãn* auf objektive, thatsächlich vorliegende Verhältnisse oder Gründe, *κε* dagegen auf subjektive, der persönlichen Meinung oder Empfindung der Redenden entspringende Umstände hindeute, lässt sich nicht sicher erweisen." Pierre Chantraine⁴ is of a similar opinion. He ascribes "une valeur emphatique" to *ãn* and at the same time points to the fact that *ãn* has its accent, while *κε* is enclitic. However, "l'étude de l'emploi des particules *κε* et *ãn* présente, en définitive, de graves difficultés."⁵

Eduard Schwyzzer⁶ adopts a contrary attitude: "Die Enklise von *κε* . . . gegenüber *ãn* macht keinen Bedeutungsunterschied, um so weniger, als auch *ãn* nie den Satz eröffnet, sondern dessen zweite Stelle bevorzugt; . . . im Epos, wo *κε(ν)* und *ãn* nebeneinander stehen, wird ein Bedeutungsunterschied nicht deutlich." K. Forbes⁷ goes even further and endeavors to prove that *ãn* derives from an erroneous division: *οὐ καν* > *οὐκ ãν*; *ãn* accordingly owes, as it were, its existence to a misunderstanding.

I

If we consider these mutually conflicting views as not yielding a satisfactory solution, we should try to approach the problem by inquiring into situations in which Homer prefers the use of the particle *ãn* to that of *κε* (and vice versa).

1. *Syntaktische Forschungen* (Halle, 1871–88), 1:89.

2. "Zu den griechischen Modi," *IF* 45 (1927):52.

3. *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache: Satzlehre*³ (Hannover, 1898–1904), 1:208.

4. *Grammaire homérique* (Paris, 1958–63), 2:346.

5. *Ibid.*, 2:349.

6. *Griechische Grammatik*, vol. 2, ed. A. Debrunner (Munich, 1950), p. 305.

7. "The Relations of the Particle *ãn* with *κε(ν)* κα καν," *Glotta* 37 (1958): 179 ff. Cf. *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, s.v. *ãn*, cols. 704, 709 ("kein Unterschied der Funktion mehr aufweisbar"). Forbes's theory is rejected by D. J. N. Lee, "The Modal Particles *ãn*, *κε(ν)*, κα," *AJP* 88 (1967): 45–56.

Such an investigation shows, in the first place, that, if there is a question of characterizing the relationship between gods and men (or Zeus and the other gods), then the statement is modified by ἄν:

- Il.* 5. 362: Τυδεΐδης, ὃς νῦν γε καὶ ἄν Διὶ πατρὶ μάχοιτο
Il. 6. 129: οὐκ ἄν ἐγὼ γε θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι μαχοίμην
Il. 8. 21–22: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν ἐρύσαιτ' [ὦ θεοί] ἐξ οὐρανόθεν . . . Ζῆν'
Il. 8. 210 (cf. *Il.* 21. 193): οὐκ ἄν ἐγὼ γ' [Ποσειδάων] ἐθέλοιμι Διὶ Κρονίῳ μάχεσθαι
Il. 8. 406: ὅφρ' εἰδῇ γλαυκῶπις, ὅτ' ἄν ᾧ πατρὶ μάχηται
Il. 14. 247: Ζηνὸς δ' οὐκ ἄν ἐγὼ γε [Ἵπνος] Κρονίονος ἄσσον ἰκοίμην
Il. 17. 327–28: Αἰνεία, πῶς ἄν καὶ ὑπὲρ θεὸν εἰρύσσαισθε / Ἴλιον
Od. 4. 78: τέκνα φίλ', ἥτοι Ζηνὶ βροτῶν οὐκ ἄν τις ἐρίζοι
Od. 10. 573–74: τίς ἄν θεὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα / ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδοιτ'
Od. 16. 196–98: οὐ γάρ πως ἄν θνητὸς ἀνὴρ τάδε μηχανώωτο . . . ὅτε μὴ θεὸς . . . θείη νέον.

In oaths we find ἄν in clauses which contain the confirmation, but κε only in alternative or relative sentences:

- Il.* 1. 234–42: ναὶ μὰ τότε σκηπτρον . . . τότε δ' οὐ τι δυνήσεται . . . χραισμεῖν, εὖτ' ἄν . . .
Il. 15. 40: . . . τὸ μὲν [λέχος κουρίδιον] οὐκ ἄν ἐγὼ ποτε μὰψ ὁμόσαιμι [Ἥρη]
Il. 20. 310–16: ἐννοσίγαι', αὐτὸς σὺ μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι νύησον / Αἰνείαν, ἥ κέν μιν ἐρύσσει, ἥ κεν ἑάσεις . . . ἥ τοι μὲν γὰρ νῶϊ πολέας ὠμόσσαμεν ὅρκους . . . ἐγὼ [Ἥρη] καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, / μὴ ποτ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀλεξήσιν . . . μηδ' ὀπότ' ἄν . . .
Od. 2. 373–74: ἀλλ' ὅμοσον [Εὐρύκλεια] μὴ μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθήσασθαι, / πρίν γε ὅτ' ἄν . . . (cf. *Od.* 4. 749 ὥς ἄν μὴ . . . ἰάπτῃς; *Il.* 3. 280 ff.)

Further, we have ἄν in prophecies⁸ (with κε, as in oaths, used only in alternative or relative sentences):

- Od.* 1. 40–41: ἐκ γὰρ Ὅρεσταιο τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδαο, / ὀππότ' ἄν ἡβήσῃ
Od. 4. 475–78: οὐ γὰρ τοι πρίν μοῖρα φίλους τ' ἰδέειν καὶ ἰκέσθαι / οἶκον . . . πρίν γ' ὅτ' ἄν Αἰγύπτιοι . . . αὐτίς ὕδαρ ἔλθῃς . . .

in solemn declarations (ἄν twice after μάν):

- Il.* 7. 459–60: ἄγρει μάν, ὅτ' ἄν αὐτε . . . Ἀχαιοὶ / οἴχωνται
Il. 8. 373: ἔσται μάν, ὅτ' ἄν αὐτε φίλῃν γλαυκῶπιδα εἴπῃ
Il. 10. 325–26: τόφρα γὰρ ἐς στρατὸν εἴμι διαμπερές, ὅφρ' ἄν ἴκωμαι [Δόλων] / νῆ'
Il. 22. 387–88: . . . τοῦ [Πατρόκλου] δ' οὐκ ἐπιλήσομαι, ὅφρ' ἄν ἐγὼ γε [Ἀχιλλεύς] / ζῶοισιν μετέω (cf. *Il.* 24. 439; *Od.* 3. 353, 5. 177 and 188, 10. 342)

in threats:

- Il.* 1. 232 (Achilles to Agamemnon): ἥ γὰρ ἄν, Ἀτρεΐδῃ, νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο
Il. 2. 250 (Odysseus to Thersites): τῷ οὐκ ἄν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύεις
Il. 3. 54 (Hector to Paris): οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμη κίθαρις τά τε δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης
Il. 8. 406: ὅφρ' εἰδῇ γλαυκῶπις, ὅτ' ἄν ᾧ πατρὶ μάχηται
Il. 22. 20 (Achilles to Apollo): ἥ σ' ἄν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δυνάμεις γε παρείη
Od. 2. 76 (Telemachus to the elders): εἴ χ' ὑμεῖς γε φάγοιτε, τάχ' ἄν ποτε καὶ τίσις εἴη

and in gnomes:

- Od.* 18. 31: . . . πῶς δ' ἄν σὺ νωτέρω ἀνδρὶ μάχοιο;
 Compare *Il.* 9. 77; *Od.* 18. 414–15, etc.

8. Cf. *Il.* 6. 448 (= 4. 164) ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅτ' ἄν ποτ' Ὀδῶλῃ Ἴλιος ἰρή. This is the only ἄν in Hector's speech—as against κε five times: 6. 443, 452, 454, 456, 457.

Moreover, comparisons—if they are introduced by a particle at all—make use of *ἄν* exclusively (ὥς δ' ὅτ' *ἄν*), and *κε* appears only in secondary clauses, expressing desire or anticipation.⁹ On the other hand, *ἄν* never occurs with the optative of *φάναι* (we find only *φαίης κε*, οὐ *κε φαίης*, etc.), nor after the disjunctive *ἢ*.¹⁰ In the sixteen alternative clauses¹¹ which use the particles, we find *εἰ (μέν) κε*—*εἰ δέ κε* fifteen times, *εἰ μὲν κε*—*εἰ δ' ἄν* only once (*Il.* 21. 553–56 *εἰ μὲν κεν . . . φεύγω*, *εἰ δ' ἄν ἐγώ . . . ἔάσω* [see p. 125]).

In this connection a comparison between the sentences introduced by *ῥορ'* *ἄν* and *ῥορα κε* may be helpful. There are twenty-three sentences introduced by *ῥορ'* *ἄν* (two are variant readings)¹² and twenty sentences introduced by *ῥορα κε*.¹³ In those introduced by *ῥορ'* *ἄν*, all expectations find their fulfillment (except for *Il.* 21. 588—an illusory reflection of Agenor). In seven sentences of the group introduced by *ῥορα κε* expectations are not accomplished:

Il. 6. 258, Hector is not prepared to accept the drink offered by his mother;

Il. 10. 444, Dolon in vain asks Diomedes for mercy;

Il. 19. 190, Achilles takes a negative attitude toward Agamemnon's proposal;

Il. 24. 553, Achilles angrily refuses Priam's request for the *immediate* redemption of his son's body;

Od. 2. 124 and 204, Odysseus puts an end to the suitors' outrages;

Od. 4. 588, Telemachus is unwilling to tarry longer with Menelaus.

II

Taking as our starting point the quotations set out so far, let us now consider the extent to which the use of *ἄν* might be metrically motivated. Of the ten quotations adduced in the first group (p. 117), *Il.* 8. 406 (*ῥορ' εἰδῆ γλαυκῶπις*, ὅτ' *ἄν* *ῥ πατρὶ μάχηται*) is the only one in which *κε* cannot be used. Nor can *κε* be substituted in five further verses of the fourteen cited for ὅτ' *ἄν* in Gehring,¹⁴ i.e., in *Il.* 1. 519, 4. 53, 4. 164, 8. 420, and 9. 101.

The phrase *ὁπότ' ἄν* is an anapest in seven passages collected by Gehring,¹⁵ including *Il.* 20. 316 (p. 117), *μηδ' ὁπότ' ἄν*; in none of these can *κε* be used instead of *ἄν*. On the other hand, *ὁππότ' ἄν* (dactyl) occurs five times, and in each case *ὁππότε κε* is a metrically possible substitution.

In *Od.* 2. 76 (*εἰ χ' ὕμεις γε φάγοιτε, τάχ' ἄν ποτε καὶ τίσις εἴη*, p. 117) *κε* cannot be substituted for *ἄν*. But the following passages plainly show that the poet could at his discretion use either *τάχ' ἄν* or *τάχα κε*:

9. *Il.* 14. 416, 18. 213 and 601, 22. 192; *Od.* 24. 7. N.B. Comparisons have a gnomic character.

10. *ἢ*—*ἢ κε*: *Il.* 11. 431–33, 22. 109–110; *Od.* 4. 546, 8. 570–71. *ἢ κε*—*ἢ*: *Od.* 1. 268, 4. 80, 21. 197. *ἢ κε*—*ἢ κε*: *Il.* 8. 532–33, 9. 619 and 701–2, 13. 742–43, 18. 308, 20. 311, 22. 244–46; *Od.* 4. 733–34, 12. 156–57, 14. 183–84, 15. 300.

11. *Il.* 3. 281–84 (3. 288–89 *εἰ δ' ἄν . . . τιμῆν . . . τίνοιεν οὐκ ἐθέλωσι* in continuation of the contents of 286), 7. 77–81, 9. 412–14, 10. 449–52, 12. 67–71 (*εἰ μὲν—εἰ δέ κε*), 17. 91–94, 22. 99–111; *Od.* 1. 287–89, 2. 218–20, 5. 466–70, 11. 110–12, 12. 137–39, 14. 395–98, 16. 403–5, 17. 79–82. Cf. also alternative relative clauses as, e.g., *Il.* 9. 508 ff. et alibi.

12. *Od.* 10. 65, 23. 151.

13. A. Gehring, *Index Homericus* (Leipzig, 1891), s.v. *ῥορα*, col. 647.

14. Ibid., s.v. *ῥορ'*, col. 627.

15. Ibid., s.v. *ὁπότε*, col. 606.

Il. 2. 373: τῷ κε τάχ' ἡμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος

Il. 11. 654: δεινὸς ἀνὴρ· τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόωτο

Il. 13. 676–77: λαοὶ ὑπ' Ἀργείων· τάχα δ' ἄν καὶ κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν / ἐπλετο.

In comparisons, the phrase ὥς δ' ὅτε κε does not occur; ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν occurs twelve times.¹⁶ But κε could, theoretically, be substituted for ἄν in every case. Similarly, in the alternative clauses of *Il.* 21. 553–56 (pp. 118, 125), εἰ δ' ἄν ἐγὼ could read εἰ δέ κ' ἐγώ.

Finally, it should be mentioned that ὄφρα κ' could in every case (cf. p. 118, n. 12) be used instead of ὄφρ' ἄν; and εὔτε κε (which, incidentally, does not occur) could be substituted for εὔτ' ἄν, without violating meter, in five of the eight passages collected in Gehring:¹⁷ *Il.* 1. 242, 19. 158; *Od.* 17. 320, 17. 323, 18. 194.

It is thus possible to replace ἄν by κε in the majority of cases, and it seems therefore clear that the choice of ἄν does not depend on metrical considerations.

III

We can now tackle the problem of the differences between the use of ἄν and the use of κε. Kühner–Gerth state (1:208) that the action “als unter gewissen Umständen wirklich eintretend bezeichnet wird” through the addition of the two particles. A small modification of this statement puts us on the right path. We need only insert the word “beziehungsweise” (“respectively”) between “unter gewissen Umständen” and “wirklich,” for the former to refer to κε and the latter to ἄν—since it transpires from the examples already discussed that ἄν is the particle used in depicting situations the validity of which is presupposed, in reinforcing a statement or declaration; and κε is preferred in constructions suggesting alternatives or lack of certainty. ἄν thus underlies the validity of the statement and may be rendered by “truly, really”; κε expresses possibility and accordingly approaches the meaning of “perhaps, possibly.”

Let us now endeavor to prove the truth of these conclusions by analyzing a few quotations.

ἐπεὶ ἄν—ἐπεὶ κε:

Il. 6. 411–12: . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἄλλη / ἔσται θαλπωρή, ἐπεὶ ἄν σύ γε πότμον ἐπίσπης

“when fate actually overtakes you . . .” (the main theme of the conversation between Hector and Andromache)

Il. 2. 474–75: τοὺς δ', ὥς τ' αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν αἰπόλοιο ἄνδρες / ρεῖα διακρίνωσιν, ἐπεὶ κε νομῶ μίγλωσι

“when, somehow, they have got mixed in the pasture . . .”

ὄφρ' ἄν—ὄφρα κε: “certainly until”—“until it be”

Il. 1. 509–510: τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι τίθει κράτος, ὄφρ' ἄν Ἀχαιοὶ . . . τίσωσι

“let the Trojans be victorious throughout until . . .”

Il. 24. 553–54: μὴ μέ πω ἐς θρόνον ἴζε, διοτρεφέες, ὄφρα κεν Ἐκτωρ / κῆται

“ask me not to sit down, in any event not while . . .”

16. *Ibid.*, s.v. ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν, col. 870.

17. *Ibid.*, s.v., εὔτε, col. 334.

τίς ἄν—τίς κε:¹⁸ “is there actually?”—“perhaps someone?”

Od. 8. 208: . . . τίς ἄν φιλέοντι μάχοιτο;

“to whomever would it occur to fight his friend?” (gnomic)

Il. 17. 586: Ἐκτορ, τίς κέ σ' ἔτ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν ταρβήσειεν;

“could there yet be an Achaean to be afraid of you?” (Apollo to Hector, who allowed himself to be intimidated by Menelaus)

οὐκ ἄν τις—οὐ κέν τις:¹⁹ “truly”—“probably no one”

Il. 24. 439: οὐκ ἄν τίς τοι, πομπὸν ὀνοσάμενος, μαχέσαιο

“of this you may be certain: should someone dare to chide your companion, he would not then be able to harm you much more” (Hermes to Priam on their way to Achilles)

Od. 23. 187–88: ἀνδρῶν δ' οὐ κέν τις ζῶος βροτὸς οὐδὲ μάλ' ἥβῶν / ρεία μετοχλίσσειεν [λέχος]

“no one, I think, could . . .”

ὅς ἄν—ὅς κε:

Od. 19. 329–32: ὅς μὲν ἀπηνῆς αὐτὸς ἔη . . . ὅς δ' ἄν ἀμύμων αὐτὸς ἔη

“but truly, whoever were of noble disposition . . .” (gnomic)

Il. 17. 100–101: τῷ μ' οὔτις . . . νεμεσῆσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδῃται / Ἐκτορι χωρήσαντ'

“whoever might be able to see . . .”

πῶς ἄν—πῶς κε:²⁰ “is it conceivable?”—“could it be possibly?”

Il. 10. 243: πῶς ἄν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆος ἐγὼ θείοιο λαθοίμην;

“how is it conceivable to pass over Odysseus?”

Il. 17. 149–51: πῶς κε σὺ χεῖρονα φῶτα σαώσεις μεθ' ὄμιλον, / σχέτλι', ἐπεὶ Σαρπῆδον' ἅμα ξείνον καὶ ἐταῖρον / κάλλιπες

“how could one expect you to defend . . .” (Glaucus to Hector)

ἦ τ' ἄν—ἦ κεν:²¹ “yes, truly”—“possibly”

Il. 1. 232: ἦ γὰρ ἄν, Ἀτρεΐδῃ, νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο

“I assure you, Atrides . . .” (Achilles to Agamemnon)

Il. 1. 293–94: ἦ γὰρ κεν δειλὸς τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καλεοίμην / εἰ . . . ὑπέξομαι

“yes, then might I be called ‘coward’ and ‘contemptible’ . . .” (Achilles refuses to obey Agamemnon)

βουλοίμην ἄν—βουλοίμην κε:

Od. 3. 232–34: βουλοίμην δ' ἄν ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἄλγεα πολλὰ μογήσας / οἴκαδ' ἔλθμεναι . . . ἦ . . .

“truly, I should prefer to go home after a long and thorny road . . .” (Athena, trying to make Odysseus' long absence more bearable to Telemachus by comparing Agamemnon's fate to that of Odysseus)

Od. 16. 106–7: βουλοίμην κ' ἐν ἐμοῖσι κατακτάμενος μεγάροισι / τεθνῆναι ἦ . . .

“I would prefer to lie killed at home . . .” (Odysseus prefers death to submission to the suitors)

18. Cf. also τίς ἄν: *Il.* 9. 77, 24. 367; *Od.* 5. 100, 10. 573. τίς κε: *Il.* 10. 303, 17. 260; *Od.* 3. 113, 4. 443, 10. 383, 21. 258, 22. 12.

19. Cf. also οὐκ ἄν: *Il.* 8. 369 and 455, 19. 271; *Od.* 4. 240, 15. 321 et passim. οὐ κεν: *Il.* 9. 125, 12. 58 and 447, 14. 91; *Od.* 4. 64 and 223 et passim. For variant readings, see p. 124.

20. Cf. also πῶς ἄν: *Il.* 9. 437, 17. 327; *Od.* 8. 352, 18. 31. πῶς κεν: *Il.* 14. 333, 19. 81, 22. 202; *Od.* 9. 351, 11. 144, 15. 195.

21. Cf. also ἦ . . . ἄν: *Il.* 2. 242, 16. 687, 22. 20 and 49. ἦ κεν: *Il.* 1. 255, 3. 56, 5. 885, 7. 125, 9. 303, 13. 815, 17. 38, 20. 94, 22. 16 and 43; *Od.* 8. 336, 15. 431, 18. 357, 19. 569, 20. 306.

δπότ' ἄν δή—δπότε κεν δή:

Od. 10. 508: ἀλλ' ὅπ' ἄν δὴ νηϊ δι' Ὠκεανοῖο περήσῃς
 "if you, following this route, finally cross the Ocean . . ."

Od. 11. 127–28: ὅπ' ἄν κεν δὴ τοι ξυμβλήμενος ἄλλος ὁδίτης / φήῃ
 "should you, by chance, meet a wayfarer . . ."

In the next examples, I will analyze a few compound and complex sentences in which both particles are used:

Il. 24. 565–67: οὐ γάρ κε τλαίη βροτὸς ἐλθέμεν, οὐδὲ μάλ' ἡβῶν, / ἐς στρατόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν φυλακοὺς λάθοι, οὐδὲ κ' ὄχῃα / ρεῖα μετοχλίσσειε θυράων ἡμετεράων
 "it is not likely that anyone, be he even a young and strong man, would dare to enter our camp; certainly he would not succeed in passing our guards and no hand could heave back lightly the bolt that bars the gates . . ."

Il. 3. 65–66: οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐρικυδέα δῶρα, / ὅσσα κεν αὐτοὶ δῶσιν, ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις ἔλοιτο
 "it does not do to refuse the gifts which the gods occasionally might offer; whereas of his own will no man could win them . . ."

Il. 14. 126–27: τῷ οὐκ ἄν με γένος γε κακὸν καὶ ἀνάλκιδα φάντες / μῦθον ἀτιμήσαιτε πεφασμένον, ὃν κ' εὖ εἴπω
 "therefore you will certainly not call me 'ignoble' or 'unworthy' nor disregard my well-meaning advice—whatever its tenor might be . . ."

Il. 19. 190–210: Agamemnon's invitation to Achilles and Achilles' reply
 μῖμνετε δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἀολλέες, ὄφρα κε δῶρα / ἐκ κλισίης ἔλθῃσι καὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ τάμωμεν [190–91]
 "do stay until all gifts can have arrived here . . ."

. . . ἦ τ' ἄν ἐγὼ γε / νῦν μὲν ἀνώγοιμι πτολεμίζειν υἱὰς Ἀχαιῶν . . . πρὶν δ' οὐ πως ἄν ἔμοι γε φίλον κατὰ λαίμων λείη / οὐ πόσις οὐδὲ βρώσις [205–6, 209–210]

"it now truly is my earnest endeavor to call the Achaeans to battle . . . I would be unable, before that, either to eat or drink . . ."

Od. 1. 287–89: εἰ μὲν κεν πατὴρ βίσιον καὶ νόστον ἀκούσῃς, / ἦ τ' ἄν, τρυχόμενός περ, ἔτι τλαίης ἐνιαυτόν· / εἰ δέ κε . . .
 "assuming you hear your father lives and is on his way home, then your difficulties will end within a year; should you, however . . ."

Od. 2. 74–78: ἔμοι δέ κε κέρδιον εἶη / ὑμέας ἐσθήμεναι κειμήλιά τε πρόβασίν τε. / εἰ χ' ὑμεῖς γε φάγοιτε, τάχ' ἄν ποτε καὶ τίσις εἶη. / τόφρα γὰρ ἄν κατὰ ἄστν ποτιπτυσσοίμεθα μύθῳ / χρήματ' ἀπαιτίζοντες, ἕως κ' ἀπὸ πάντα δοθείη
 "if only it were you yourselves that were devouring our treasure and our flocks, I think we should be better off. For in that case we should not have far to look for compensation. We should simply dun you up and down the town for the restitution of our goods till [eventually] every item was repaid."²²

Il. 3. 281 ff., the agreement between the Trojans and the Achaeans before the duel:

εἰ μὲν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος καταπέφυη . . . ἐχέτω . . . εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνειν ξανθὸς Μενέλαος, / Τρώας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι,²³ / τιμὴν δ'

22. Trans. by E. V. Rieu, Penguin Classics (Baltimore, 1946), p. 39.

23. Chantraine observes (*Gramm. hom.*, 2:316): "On a noté que l'infinitif en fonction d'impératif se trouve après une préposition au futur pour indiquer à la personne à qui l'on s'adresse le rôle qui lui revient." He quotes *Il.* 22. 259 and *Od.* 4. 408. It may be assumed that this passage deals with the style in agreements, and we find (as Chantraine implies) that (a) the infinitive is used when reference is made to the obligations of the other contracting party; (b) the imperative mood (3d

'Αργεῖοις ἀποτινέμεν, ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν . . . εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοὶ τιμὴν Πριάμος Πριάμοιο τε παῖδες / τίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν . . . [281–82, 284–86, 288–89]

"assuming Alexander kills Menelaus, then . . . Should, however, Menelaus be victorious, the Trojans shall undertake to return Helen and the treasures, and to pay appropriate reparation money. But woe be to the Trojans if Priam and his house refuse to pay the penalty."

Il. 13. 741–44: ἐνθεν δ' ἂν μάλα πᾶσαν ἐπιφρασσάμεθα βουλὴν / ἥ κεν ἐνὶ νήεσσι πολυκλήϊσι πύσωμεν, / αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσι θεὸς δόμεναι κράτος, ἥ κεν ἔπειτα . . . ἔλθωμεν
"then would be the time to consider whether we should attack the ships (and rely on the chance that some god would grant us victory) or whether it would be preferable . . ."

Il. 3. 52–54: οὐκ ἂν δὴ μείνεις ἀρηϊφίλον Μενέλαον; / γυνόῃς χ', οἴου φωτὸς ἔχεις θαλερὴν παράκοιτιν. / οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμη κίθαρις . . .
"no, you would not dare to stand face to face with the son of Atreus, for you would have learned what type of man you robbed of his fair spouse. Nor will the lyre be of use to you now . . ."²⁴

An examination of the clauses in which ἂν and κε appear side by side is now indicated. Here follow the passages:

Il. 11. 187–91: ὄφρ' ἂν μὲν κεν ὄρῃ 'Αγαμέμνονα . . . θύνοντ' . . . ἐναίροντα / τόφρ' ἀναχωρεῖτω . . . αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κ' . . .

Il. 13. 127–28: . . . ἄς [φάλαγγας] οὗτ' ἂν κεν Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθὼν / οὔτε κ' Ἀθηναίη

Il. 24. 437: σοὶ δ' ἂν ἐγὼ πομπὸς καὶ κε κλυτὸν Ἄργος ἰκοίμην

Od. 5. 361–63: ὄφρ' ἂν μὲν κεν δούρατ' ἐν ἁρμονίῃσι ἀρήρη / τόφρ' . . . αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν . . .

Od. 6. 259–62: ὄφρ' ἂν μὲν κ' ἀγροὺς ἴομεν . . . τόφρα . . . αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν . . .

Od. 9. 334: οἱ δ' ἔλαχον τοὺς ἂν κε καὶ ἤθελον αὐτὸς ἐλθεῖν

Od. 18. 318–19: ἥνπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλωσιν εὐθρονον Ἡῶ μίμνεν / οὔτι με νικήσουσι.

The view that the particles are synonymous has led occasionally to the conclusion that these passages are corrupt.²⁵ However, in accordance with basic notions of contemporary structural linguistics, co-occurrence of two expressions in the same clause excludes identity of their categorial function or meaning. The passages just quoted are to be interpreted in the light of this principle.

pers. sing.) is used of the obligation which the speaker takes upon himself in favor of the other party; and (c) the obligations devolving on the speaker's contracting party are expressed by the use of the future tense (1st pers. sing.) or the subjunctive mood:

Il. 3. 281 ff.: 285–86 ἀποδοῦναι, ἀποτινέμεν (a); 282 ἐχέτω (b); 283 νεώμεθα (c).

Il. 7. 77 ff.: 79 δόμεναι (a); 78 φερέτω (b); 82–84 οἶσω, ἀποδώσω (c).

Il. 22. 256 ff.: 259 ῥέξειν (a); 256–59 ἀεικιά, δώσω (c).

Cf. also *Od.* 17. 83 φέρειν (a).

Passages such as *Il.* 15. 158 f. βάσκι' ὅτι—ἀγγεῖλαι (further quotations at Chantraine, *Gramm. hom.*, 2:316) remind one of Plaut. *Merc.* 787 i, *rogato* (cf. J. B. Hofmann–A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (Munich, 1965), p. 340, §188); in other words, the infinitive used as imperative orders an action to be implemented in the (near) future. This impression is reinforced by the juxtaposition of future and infinitive (= imperative) in the sentences just quoted. Perhaps this should be the starting point for examination of the use of the infinitive (in any case as volitive) in Homer.

24. Cf. also *Il.* 13. 321 ff., 14. 244 ff.; *Od.* 2. 184 ff., 18. 27 ff., 22. 132 ff. et alibi.

25. A. Meillet, *Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque*⁷ (Paris, 1965), p. 176: "Seules, des parties relativement récentes des poèmes homériques semblent offrir ἂν, et parfois avec une incohérence dont le vers Ω 437 présente un bon exemple." E. Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, 2:305–6, n. 4: "Die

Kühner–Gerth (1:248) note the parallel construction of several of these passages:

- Il.* 11. 187–91: (ῥοφρ' ἄν μὲν) κεν—(αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ) κ'
Od. 5. 361–63 } (ῥοφρ' ἄν μὲν) κεν—(αὐτὰρ ἐπ-)ήν
Od. 6. 259–62 }
Il. 13. 127–28: οὐτ' ἄν κεν—οὐτε κε

These are alternative phrases and should be analyzed accordingly. In *Il.* 11. 187 ff. two different phases are described, divided by κε . . . κε: Agamemnon fights; Agamemnon is wounded and jumps onto the chariot. For each of these stages, Hector is given instructions. ῥοφρ' ἄν introduces the first stage, and κε (187) should be related to the participles θύοντ', ἐναίροντα (188), forming the parallel to ἀλεταί (192): “as long as he sees Agamemnon busy . . . ; should Agamemnon, however . . .”

The construction is similar in *Od.* 5. 361–63 and *Od.* 6. 259–62, with the difference that ἄν (in ἐπὶ) confers reality on the second clause also.

In *Il.* 13. 127–28 the situation is slightly different, since ἄν belongs to ὀνόσαιτ' with double subject: “be it Ares, be it Athena, neither would ever be able to . . .” *Od.* 4. 733–34 offers an interesting comparison (in connection with *Il.* 13. 127–28) between ἄν and κε: τῷ κε μάλ' ἢ κεν ἔμεινε, καὶ ἐσσύμενός περ ὁδοῖο, / ἢ κε με τεθνηυῖαν ἐνὶ μεγάροισι ἔλειπεν. The first κε shows that Penelope gives expression to an assumption (contrary to the certainty indicated by ἄν in *Il.* 13. 127), and this assumption is split in two by ἢ κε . . . ἢ κε. The construction of *Il.* 13. 486 is similar: αἰψά κεν ἢ ἐφύρειτο μέγα κράτος ἢ ἐφεροίμην (“then it may come to pass that either . . . or . . .”).²⁶

In *Il.* 24. 437 Hermes affirms: “Upon my word, I shall give you safe conduct—be it to Argos!” That is, ἄν must be joined to ἰκοίμην and κε before κλυτὸν Ἄργος implies “to any place whatever, even to Argos.”

As to the construction of *Od.* 9. 334 and *Od.* 18. 318–19, Chantraine²⁷ shows that the particles ἄν and κε occasionally belong to an infinitive. If this statement is applied to these two passages, we find that ἄν in both cases qualifies ἐθέλω and κε the respective infinitives. The meaning of these sentences is as follows:

Od. 9. 334: οἱ δ' ἔλαχον τοὺς ἄν κε καὶ ἤθελον αὐτὸς ἐλέσθαι
 “had it been, by chance, my turn to choose, I would certainly have selected the same men . . .”

Od. 18. 318–19: ἤνπερ γὰρ κ' ἐθέλωσιν ἑυθρονον Ἥῳ μῖμνεν / οὐτὶ με νυκτῆσουσι
 “for if they really intend to extend the night into dawn even . . .”

wenigen Fälle bei Homer . . . in denen ἄν und κε im gleichen Satz oder unmittelbar nacheinander stehen” do not prove any difference of meaning between the particles. Chantraine, *Gramm. hom.*, 2:263: “En quatre passages, on lit ῥοφρ' ἄν . . . κεν, mais le texte risque d'être altéré.”

26. Cf. also Parmenides frag. 8. 19 D.–K.: πῶς δ' ἄν ἐπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν [MSS, Diels]; πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο; The construction of this passage is similar to that of *Il.* 13. 127: πῶς δ' ἄν realizes the superordinal notion ramified in πέλοι—κε γένοιτο (“truly, how is it then conceivable that what is could come into being, should, somehow, have become?”). The omission of κε in the first clause offers no problem if one considers, e.g., the combinations ἢ κε—ἢ, ἢ—ἢ κε (*Od.* 4. 80; *Il.* 22. 109–110).

27. *Gramm. hom.*, 2:311, §453.

IV

Let us endeavor, in conclusion, to exploit these results for the purpose of textual criticism.

Il. 6. 113–14: ὄφρ' ἄν [var. ὄφρα κ'] ἐγὼ βῆω προτὶ Ἴλιον ἥδ' ἐρέουσιν / εἴπω

Od. 22. 377: ὄφρ' ἄν [var. ὄφρα κ'] ἐγὼ κατὰ δῶμα πονήσομαι ὅττεό με χρεή

Il. 12. 465–66: . . . οὐκ ἄν [var. οὐ κέν] τίς μιν ἐρυκάκοι ἀντιβολήσας / νόσφι θεῶν

Il. 13. 288–90: εἴ περ γάρ κε βλῆο πονεῖμενος ἢ τυπείης, / οὐκ ἄν [var. οὐ κεν] ἐν αὐχέν' ὀπισθε πέσοι βέλος οὐδ' ἐνὶ νώτῳ, / ἀλλὰ κεν ἢ στέρνων ἢ νηδύος ἀντιάσειεν

Il. 24. 439: οὐκ ἄν [var. οὐ κέν] τίς τοι πομπὸν ὀνοσάμενος μαχέσαιο

Il. 6. 112–13 and *Od.* 22. 375–77 contain orders, as do *Il.* 7. 193, 8. 374 ff., 17. 185–86, 18. 408–9; *Od.* 13. 411–12: “do . . . until I . . .” However, if ὄφρα κε is used in similarly constructed phrases, then it is only if the person speaking has neither the right nor the intention of issuing orders (*Il.* 6. 258, 10. 443–44, 19. 190–91, 24. 430–31 and 553–54; *Od.* 4. 587–88, 19. 16–17). *Il.* 12. 465 has as its theme Hector’s unconquerable might: the gods alone can curb him. *Il.* 13. 289 characterizes Meriones: a hero—such as he—is never wounded in the neck or back; at worst he could suffer a chest or abdominal injury. In *Il.* 24. 439 ἄν has the same assertive power as in line 437 (see p. 123): Hermes would like Priam to be inspired with implicit confidence. I think, therefore, that the reinforcing particle ἄν is to be chosen in all five passages.

Il. 1. 167–68: . . . ἐγὼ δ' ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε [γέρας] / ἔρχομ' ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπεὶ κε [var. ἐπὶν κε] κάμω πολέμῳ

Here κε must be retained, as ἄν κε cannot be justifiably used.

Od. 12. 138: ἦ τ' ἄν ἔτ' [var. καὶ κεν ἔτ'] εἰς Ἰθάκην . . . ἵκοισθε

Since we read καὶ κεν ἔτ' in *Od.* 11. 111, it is to be assumed that the same reading must be retained here. As regards the content, there could be no objection to either ἄν or κε, depending on what exactly Homer would like Circe to express—possibility or certainty of the return home in given circumstances.

Od. 23. 151: εἴρυσθαι μέγα δῶμα διαμπερές, ὄφρ' ἄν ἵκοιτο [vars. ἦος ἵκοιτο, εἰς ο κεν ελθῇ²⁸]

ὄφρ' ἄν means “surely until” a certain event, the occurrence of which is taken for granted. That is why this variant is appropriate here—in the sense of the slandering neighbors—and why the papyrus version “until he perhaps will come” must be rejected. ἦος on the other hand (“jusqu’à,” Chantaine²⁸) expresses the objective aim, the final purpose, and is therefore to be preferred in *Il.* 13. 141: . . . ὁ δ' [ὀλοοίτροχος] ἀσφαλέως θέει ἔμπεδον, ὄφρ' ἄν [var. ἦος] ἵκηται.

V

If we now turn back to the results of previous inquiries, with which this discussion began (p. 116), we can see that the differences between the particles ἄν and κε which we have elucidated are consistent with, and in some cases clarify, the findings of earlier scholars.

Let us begin with Delbrück's summary of the differences between ἄν and κε. (1) "ἄν hat eine Neigung zu negativen Sätzen . . ." The explanation of this phenomenon may be that negations are generally of a much more absolute character than affirmations. "I do not want" means "I will not"; "I want," on the other hand, is quite far removed from "I shall." (2) "κε hat eine entschiedene Vorliebe für die konjunktivischen Relativsätze . . ." κε often finds its place in relative clauses, inasmuch as these are frequently conditional—in the sense of "if perhaps someone" (cf. *Il.* 1. 64, 9. 313 et alibi). Of the three subjunctive relative clauses with ἄν, *Il.* 8. 10 (= 15. 348) contains a threat, *Od.* 19. 332 (p. 120) brings a gnome, and so does *Od.* 21. 293–94: . . . ὅσ τε [οἶνος] καὶ ἄλλους / βλάπτει δς ἄν μιν χαλδὸν ἔλῃ. In addition, there are two relative clauses with ἄν and the optative—both warnings (*Il.* 7. 231; *Od.* 19. 27). (3) "κε wird bisweilen in disjunctiven Satzgliedern wiederholt, ἄν nicht." The reason for the use of κε in alternative clauses now becomes clear: κε maintains its position where a doubt is expressed. That is why we find the (possibly formulaic) phrase εἰ μὲν κε—εἰ δέ κε used in sworn agreements (*Il.* 3. 281 ff., 7. 77 ff.; similarly *Il.* 22. 256 ff.), used in prophecies (*Il.* 9. 412 ff.; *Od.* 11. 110 ff.), or used deliberately (*Il.* 17. 91 ff., 22. 99 ff.). That is also why we must look for κε after the disjunctive ἢ, often in consultations (*Il.* 9. 619, 13. 742; cf. also n. 11). Here, too, the occasional use of ἄν does not disappoint us: in *Il.* 13. 741 and 22. 108 ἄν is to be found in the clause subordinating the alternative:

Il. 13. 741: ἔνθεν δ' ἄν μάλα πᾶσαν ἐπιφρασσάμεθα βουλὴν
"then it is indicated"

Il. 22. 108: . . . ἐμοὶ δὲ τότε' ἄν πολὺ κέρδιον εἶη
"upon my word, it would have been better for me"

In *Il.* 21. 556 ἄν is found in particularly strong contrast to κε. This is the only passage in which εἴ δ' ἄν follows εἰ μὲν κε:

Il. 21. 553–61: ὦ μοι ἐγών· εἰ μὲν κεν ὑπὸ κρατεροῦ Ἀχιλλῆος / φεύγω . . . εἰ δ' ἄν ἐγὼ
τούτους μὲν ὑποκλονέσθαι ἑάσω / Πηλείδῃ Ἀχιλλῆϊ, ποσὶν δ' ἀπὸ τείχεος ἄλλῃ / φεύγω
πρὸς πεδὶον Ἰλίου, ὅφρ' ἄν ἱκωμαι . . . ἐσπέριος δ' ἄν ἔπειτα . . . ἀπονεοίμην
"if Achilles should perhaps pursue me . . . , if upon my soul, I allow this force to be
driven back by Achilles and if I flee and run, run until I come . . . ; at night I then
can, blissfully . . ." (rein is given to the hope that rescue may ensue)

Chantraine's "emphatic" (p. 116) is not a very appropriate term with reference to ἄν. It nevertheless points in the right direction. Similarly Kühner–Gerth are right to a certain extent only (see p. 116): to say that ἄν refers to "actually existing conditions," while κε on the other hand presupposes "subjective circumstances, depending on personal opinion," does not quite hit the mark. Both ἄν and κε modify subjective or objective statements—according to the circumstances. But certainly the fact that ἄν is accented and κε is enclitic should not be overlooked: ἄν affirms, κε introduces a surmise.